





































a	priori	truths	of	logic.	But	we	can	give	less	controversial	examples:	for	instance,	it	can	be	rational	to	believe	the	negations	of	Kripkean	a	posteriori	necessary	truths	–Hesperus	is	distinct	from	Phosphorus,	water	is	not	composed	of	H2O,	and	so	on.	In	defense	of	Williams,	however,	these	propositions	are	not	self-falsifying.	They	are	necessarily	false,	and	so	false	whenever	believed,	but	believing	them	doesn’t	make	them	false,	since	they	are	false	whether	or	not	they	are	believed.	So	the	challenge	remains	to	give	a	more	convincing	counterexample	to	the	thesis	that	all	self-falsifying	beliefs	are	irrational.	As	I’ll	explain,	Moore	himself	provides	the	materials	we	need	for	constructing	a	counterexample.	Moore	(1993:	208)	uses	the	following	pair	of	sentences	to	illustrate	an	epistemic	asymmetry	between	first-person	and	third-person	perspectives:		 (8) I	don’t	believe	it’s	raining,	but	as	a	matter	of	fact	it	is.	(9) Moore	doesn’t	believe	it’s	raining,	but	as	a	matter	of	fact	it	is.		As	Moore	notes,	it’s	absurd	for	him	to	assert	(8),	but	it’s	not	absurd	for	someone	else	to	assert	(9)	in	making	reference	to	Moore.	Similarly,	it	needn’t	be	absurd	for	Moore	himself	to	assert	(9)	in	making	reference	to	himself,	so	long	as	he	is	suffering	from	amnesia	or	otherwise	rationally	ignorant	of	his	own	identity.	In	that	case,	Moore	can	rationally	believe	(9),	despite	the	fact	that	in	believing	it,	he	thereby	makes	it	false.	This	shows	that	not	all	self-falsifying	beliefs	are	irrational.19	Moorean	belief	is	irrational	not	merely	because	it’s	self-falsifying	but	because	I	can	know	that	it’s	self-falsifying.	After	all,	I	can’t	rationally	believe	what	I	know	to	be	false.	But	knowing	that	a	proposition	is	self-falsifying	doesn’t	enable	me	to	know	that	it’s	false	unless	I	also	know	that	I	believe	it.	What	makes	believing	an	omissive	Moorean	conjunction	irrational	is	the	fact	that	I	can	know,	or	rationally	believe,	the	premises	of	the	following	argument:		
																																																								19	Just	as	not	all	self-falsifying	beliefs	are	irrational,	so	not	all	self-verifying	beliefs	are	rational.	See	Pryor	2006	for	examples	and	discussion.	
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incoherence,	is	never	rational	by	ideal	standards,	but	it	can	be	rational	by	non-ideal	standards	that	take	our	human	limitations	into	account.	I’ll	close	with	two	big	picture	questions	that	deserve	more	extended	discussion	elsewhere:		 (1) If	rationality	does	not	require	knowing	about	the	external	world,	then	why	does	it	require	knowing	about	the	internal	world?	(2) Does	rationality	require	knowing	about	all	of	our	internal	states,	or	just	some	of	them?	If	some,	but	not	all,	then	how	can	we	demarcate	the	boundary?		My	answers	to	both	questions	draw	upon	a	background	theoretical	commitment	to	access	internalism.	According	to	access	internalism,	rationality	requires	knowing	about	the	internal	states	that	determine	what	rationality	requires	of	you.	It	doesn’t	require	knowing	about	the	external	world.	And	it	doesn’t	require	knowing	about	internal	states	that	play	no	role	in	determining	what	rationality	requires	of	you.	Rationality	requires	knowing	about	your	beliefs	and	conscious	experiences	because	of	their	role	in	determining	what	rationality	requires	you	to	believe	and	do.40	
																																																								40	I	am	grateful	to	audiences	at	the	University	of	Oxford	in	June	2013,	the	University	of	Syracuse	in	August	2013,	the	New	York	Institute	of	Philosophy	in	November	2013,	the	University	of	Bergen	in	May	2015,	and	the	University	of	Oslo	in	July	2015.	Many	thanks	especially	to	David	Barnett,	Matthew	Benton,	Alex	Byrne,	Paul	Egre,	Ole	Koksvik,	Jack	Lyons,	Ram	Neta,	Matthew	Parrott,	Christopher	Peacocke,	Nicholas	Silins,	and	Sydney	Shoemaker	for	helpful	comments	and	discussion.	
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